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The Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia) are the most important 
providers of beef imports for the European Union (EU). Especially Brazil and Argentina, but to a lesser 
extent also Uruguay, account for a significant share of European beef imports. On 2004-2006 average, 
almost 90% of the EU´s beef imports originated in the Mercosur countries. 
This is at least partially explained by existing trade regimes: The EU-tariff on beef imports is especially 
high. The Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff equivalent for fresh beef is over 75%, the one for frozen 
beef up to 94%. Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay enjoy preferential access to the European beef 
market via three different trade regimes: First, the multilateral frozen beef quota. Second, the multilateral 
frozen beef quota for processing. Third, the bilateral tariff rate quota (TRQ) for high quality beef. Most of 
these quotas were negotiated under the provisions of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
In the year 2000, the EU and the Mercosur countries engaged in the negotiation of a bilateral free trade 
agreement, including agricultural goods. The Mercosur countries requested a significantly increased access 
to the agricultural markets of the EU. The EU responded with a less ambitious proposal. Both proposals 
have in common that for so-called sensitive products, expansion of the existing bilateral TRQs for high 
quality beef is envisaged. In addition, reductions of the in-quota tariffs are stipulated. The two proposals 
differ in the extent of both TRQ expansions as well as tariff reduction. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse who gets benefits when the EU liberalizes Mercosur´s access to the 
beef markets. Two problems of analysis arise in this context: One is the high level of product aggregation, 
on which some TRQs, in this case those for beef, are defined. The second difficulty is the distribution of 
the windfall profits both on international as well as on national level, which is a priori unknown.
This paper provides a detailed assessment of the potential economic impact a liberalization of Mercosur
´s access to the European beef may have, involving a partial equilibrium model operating at a high level of 
product dissaggregation. The welfare analysis carried out was facilitated by a consultation of experts from 
the meat sector, allowing the allocation of the quota rents to the different stakeholders involved into the 
business. From a methodological point of view, the paper adds to existing research showing how are 
modified Takayama-Judge approach can be highly suitable to answer questions of bilateral trade 
liberalization when a low level of product aggregation is appropriate.
The paper starts off with a description of the current trade preferences between the EU and the 
Mercosur countries. This is followed by an assessment of the utilization of the current preferences, which 
allows a first estimate on whether trade liberalization will in fact lead to increased trade between the two 
country blocks. After that, an analysis of the administration of the existing TRQs and the implications for 
rent distribution is presented. The model and the scenarios are described before results are presented, 
before conclusions from the analysis are drawn.
4Current trade preferences and their utilization 
Trade preferences
The Mercosur countries´ beef exports currently benefit of trade preferences that the EU conceded mostly in 
the context of the WTO agreement on Agriculture
1. The preferences are granted through tariff rate quotas. 
There are both bilateral as well as multilateral arrangements through which the Mercosur countries have 
preferential market access. 
Three preferential trading schemes can be distinguished:
1. The bilateral TRQs for high quality beef (“High quality beef quota”)
2. The multilateral TRQ for frozen beef (“GATT frozen beef quota”)
3. The multilateral TRQ for frozen beef intended for processing within the EU 
Only certain tariff lines, defined on 8-digit level of the combined nomenclature of the EU qualify for 
imports at the preferential tariff rate. An overview of the three different TRQs is given in Table 1.
In the framework of the  high quality beef quota, the bilateral preferences are not granted to the 
Mercosur countries as a group, but to individual member states. At this point in time, Argentina has with 
28,000 tons the largest allocated TRQ, Paraguay with 1,000 tons the smallest. The MFN tariff is a 
composed tariff. It consists of a 12.8% ad valorem tariff and a specific tariff that varies between 303.4 and 
304.1 Euro per 100 kg (WTO, n.d.). Depending on the country, the ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) of this 
tariff is roughly between 75% and 85%. The preferential rate is with 20% significantly lower
One of the specificities of these high quality TRQs is that not all beef corresponding to the tariff lines 
covered by the TRQ is eligible for the TRQ. Additional criteria related to quality aspects have to be 
fulfilled. These comprise mainly requirements regarding the carcass grading, meat quality, the age of the 
animal and the feed on which the animal has been fattened (COMMISSION  OF  THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
1997). 
1 An exception to this rule ist the TRQ for high quality beef granted to Paraguay, that was opened as an autonomous 
quota. 
5Table 1 Preferential schemes for beef imports of the EU originating in the Mercosur countries
eligible country quota quantities (tonnes) MFN rate preferential rate
High quality beef quota
Argentina* 28,000    
Brazil** 5,000    
Paraguay*** 1,000 12.8% + 303.4-304.1 EUR/100KG 20%
Uruguay** 6,300    
GATT frozen beef quota
World**** 53,000 12.8% + 141.4-304.1 EUR/100KG 20%
Frozen beef for processing
World***** 50,700 12.8% + 141.4-304.1 EUR/100KG 12.8%+99.45-213.84 EUR/100KG
* For tariff lines 020130 and 02061095 of the combined nomenclature
** For tariff lines 020130, 02023090, 02062991and 02061095 of the combined nomenclature
*** For tariff lines 020130 and 02023090 of the combined nomenclature
**** For tariff lines 0202 10 00, 0202 20 10, 0202 20 30, 0202 20 50, 0202 20 90, 0202 30 10, 0202 30 50, 0202 30 90, 0206 29 91 
***** For tariff lines 0202 20 30, 0202 30 10, 0202 30 50, 0202 30 90, 0206 29 91
The GATT frozen beef quota is open to all WTO member countries. It covers frozen carcasses, half 
carcasses, cuts with bone in as well as boneless beef cuts and meat offals. The MFN tariff is also a 
composed tariff, with an AVE ranging between 66% and 94% depending on the exporting nation. The 
preferential rate is fixed at 20%. 
The TRQ for frozen beef for processing finally covers frozen beef cuts (with or without bone) and offals 
that are also eligible for the GATT frozen beef quota. The AVE of the MFN tariff is over 115%.. The in-
quota tariff is the sum of a 12.8% ad valorem tariff and, in some cases, a specific tariff that ranges between 
99 and 214 Euros per 100 kg. This translates into a AVE of the preferential tariff between 12.8% and 90%.
Utilization of the current preferences
It is a well known fact that the effect of liberalization of different quota elements hinges on the TRQ 
regime that was in place prior to the policy change (see for example MÖNNICH, 2003, BOUGHNER  ET  AL., 
2000). For this reason, analysis of the fill rate of the different TRQs is carried out in the following, again 
starting with the high quality beef TRQs, followed by the two TRQs for frozen beef. 
The shipments of beef that qualifies for the high quality beef quota allocated to Argentina are depicted 
in  Figure 1
2. It is obvious that though high quality fresh beef cuts (CN 01013000) and offals (CN 
02061095) are eligible for the TRQ, virtually only fresh beef cuts are traded. It also becomes clear that 
with the exception of the marketing years 2001 and 2002, where Argentina was hit by a severe epidemic of 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) and trade was restricted due to sanitary reasons, the quota was notably 
over filled. In other words, despite the high MFN tariff, Argentinean beef was competitive on European 
markets even when the full levy had been charged. 
2 It should be stressed that these are imports of beef that can be potentially be imported under the preferential tariff, 
but this is by no means certain. This uncertainty relates to the additional quality requirements that are not captured in 
the international trade databases. Despite considerable effort, no information on this issue could be retrieved. This 
caveat has to be made for the subsequent analysis of imports from Brazil and Uruguay, too. 
















Fresh beef, boneless (CN 02013000) Fresh thick or thin skirt (CN 02061095)
quota
Source: Own compilation based on (EUROSTAT, n.d.)
This is even more pronounced for high quality beef originating in Brazil, where imports within the 
quota hardly play a role compared to the quantities that are imported paying the full levy. This underlines 
the low cost of production and high competitiveness of Brazilian beef. A complication in the case of Brazil 
is that the high quality TRQ is open to four product specifications, of which two can be traded under the 
multilateral schemes for frozen beef, too. While only trade of fresh and frozen beef muscle cuts plays a 
role, it can not be distinguished whether the frozen cuts are imported under the bilateral scheme for high 
quality beef, the multilateral scheme for frozen beef or at full levy. 














Fresh beef, boneless (CN 02013000) Frozen beef, boneless (CN 02023090)
Fresh thick or thin skirt (CN 02061095) Frozen thick or thin skirt (CN 02062991)
quota
Source: Own compilation based on (EUROSTAT, n.d.)
The problem of differentiating between imports under different preferential trading schemes also arises 
in the case of Uruguay, which is presented in Figure 3 below. Again, both boneless fresh and frozen beef 
can be imported under the quota. In any case, even if only imports of fresh beef are taken into account, the 
quota is over-filled, and imports take place to an increasing degree at full levy.
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Source: Own compilation based on (EUROSTAT, n.d.)
Paraguay has only a small allocated quota, and, as can be seen in Figure 4, has hardly been able to 
benefit from this trade preference to the full extent. Since the marketing year 2003/2004, imports of beef 
pertaining to the tariff lines to which the TRQ is open have virtually ceased. Paraguay is therefore not 
further considered for this study.

















Fresh beef, boneless (CN 02013000) Frozen beef, boneless (CN 02023090)
quota
Source: Own compilation based on (EUROSTAT, n.d.)
In summary, it can be said that the with the exception of Paraguay, all Mercosur countries that have 
allocated TRQs for high quality beef ship beef at full levy into the EU, i.e., the quotas are over-filled and 
quota rents are generated. Yet, the degree of overfill can not be unambiguously determined due to the 
overlap with tariff lines that are also eligible for other preferential trading schemes. 
8To gain more insight into the latter issue, imports of beef that corresponds to the tariff lines that are 
covered by the multilateral TRQs are presented in Figure 5. Two different aggregations have been made: 
For the columns named “all”, imports of all products that qualify for the multilateral beef TRQ have been 
aggregated, including those that also qualify for the bilateral high quality beef quotas. 
For comparison, a second aggregation has been made, where exclusively those imports have been 
aggregated, that qualify only for the frozen beef TRQ, not for the bilateral TRQs. This aggregation is 
denominated with “excl.” in Figure 5. 















































































Source: Own compilation based on (EUROSTAT, n.d.)
Abstracting from the years in the beginning of the millennium in which the severe FMD epidemic 
struck South America and Europe, in either way of aggregation, the multilateral frozen beef TRQ is over-
filled. Another feature is that other countries than those belonging to the Mercosur, account only for small 
shares of European imports of frozen beef. 
Since it is impossible to tell under which (if at all) scheme the products that are eligible for more than 
TRQ are imported, for this study it has been assumed that under the TRQs for high quality beef, only fresh 
beef is imported. Frozen beef that could in principal be imported under the high quality TRQs, is assumed 
to be imported either at full levy or under the multilateral frozen beef TRQs. 
Quota administration and rent distribution
BOUGHNER ET AL. (2000) point out that the distribution of the rents is heavily dependant on how the quota is 
administrated, especially if and if so, to whom import or export licenses and thus the right to trade are 
allocated. In a competitive setting without bargaining power, the right to trade implies the right to obtain at 
least a share of the rent. This is not necessarily true when imperfect competition, bargaining power and 
vertical integration are introduced. 
The bilateral TRQs for high quality beef 
For the bilateral TRQ for high quality beef, the European Union has chosen to administer the importing 
side and the exporting side through import and export licenses respectively. An overview over the 
administrational procedure is given in Figure 6: Both on the exporting and importing side, the actors 
9involved in the business have to apply for the right to export or to import under the preferential scheme at 
administrational bodies in the respective country. 
Figure 6 Administration of high quality beef TRQs 
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Source: Own representation
Once traders have the right to trade a certain quantity under the preferential tariff, for each unit they 
wish to trade they have to request a specific document. On the exporting side, the document is a so-called 
certificate of authenticity; on the importing side it is called an import license. Both documents are needed 
in order to benefit from the in-quota tariff. 
The right to  import  is given to firms in the European Union, and the licenses are issued by 
administrational bodies within the European Union. A detailed description of the rules to be followed is 
given by the COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1997). In summary, the import licenses are granted 
on a license-on-demand basis. If the total quantity requested exceeds the available quantity, the requests 
are cut pro rata. 
The EU has transferred the right to ration the exporting side to the exporting countries. The authorities 
in the exporting countries allocate the rights to export and issue the certificate of authenticity. It states that 
the product to be exported fulfils the quality requirements. 
Argentina has chosen to administer the right to export under the TRQ for high quality beef by assigning 
shares to various actors in the chain
3. The recent legislation is laid down by the Secretary for Agriculture, 
Livestock Fisheries and Food (SECRETARÍA DE AGRICULTURA, 2004). Of the total quota quantity, 7 percent are 
assigned to cooperation projects between cattle producers and exporting slaughter houses. The remaining 
share of the quota is distributed between slaughter houses mainly as a function of their regional distribution 
and their past performance in beef trade. 
In Brazil the right to export is granted only to exporting companies
4, and not to producers or any other 
elements of the chain.  The procedure how the quota is administered is defined by the Ministry for 
Industrial Development and External Trade (MINISTÉRIO DO DESENVOLVIMENTO INDÚSTRIA E COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR, 
2006). The total amount of 5,000 tons for exportation is split up into two parts. 4,700 tons are distributed to 
established beef trading enterprises. Each participant has the right to a fixed quota of 24 tones and a 
variable part based on its export performance in the preceding year. The remaining 300 tones are reserved 
to new coming firms. 
3 In the history of the TRQ for high quality beef, Argentina has amended the system constantly. An overview of the 
historical development can be found in BONANSEA ET AL., 2006. 
4 These can be deboning facilities, slaughterhouses or pure trading companies. 
10In Uruguay, deboning facilities, slaughter houses and pure exporting companies can apply for a share of 
the quota based on past performance criteria. A detailed description of the rules for the distribution of the 
quota can be found in a publication of the National Meat Institute (JUNTA DEL INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE CARNES, 
2003). In addition, up to 6 percent of the total quantity or 378 tones can be distributed to so-called 
innovative projects that the National Meat Institute wants to promote, though this did not play a role at the 
time when the research for this paper was carried out. 
In the case of the bilateral TRQs for high quality beef, both the exporting side and the importing side 
are issued licenses and therefore afforded bargaining power. Under perfect competition, this would imply 
that the rents are shared between the two parties. If a different market structure prevailed, the outcome 
could be expected to be different. 
The consultation of industry experts carried out in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay revealed that the rents 
generated from the over-filled high quality beef TRQs are fully captured by the exporter. With the 
certificate of authenticity that is issued to the exporter, he or she is perfectly informed on the tariff that the 
importer has to pay when shipping the commodity to the EU. It has been stated by the interview partners 
that a different price is charged to the importer, depending on whether the cuts are exported within the 
quota or not. In practice, the price of exports within the quota is determined by market research or based on 
past experience. The (lower) price for the same cut without the certificate of authenticity is then derived by 
deducting the tariff differential.
This price setting behavior is possible for several reasons. The probably most important one is that beef 
accompanied by a certificate of authenticity is scarce. Exporters can to some degree excise market power 
over the importers. Whereas the exporting firms in Argentina and especially Brazil are well organized, the 
importing sector in the EU is rather fragmented, leaving the exporting side with bargaining power. 
Within the exporting countries, the rent remains with the entity that has been assigned the certificate of 
authenticity (meat processing and trading companies in Brazil and Uruguay, and additionally farmers 
associations in Argentina) and therefore the right to export. In none of the three countries, bargaining 
power within the meat production chain, vertical integration or other market structures that would suggest 
an alternative distribution were found. 
Multilateral beef TRQs
For the  GATT frozen beef TRQ, there is no administration of the exporting side. The control of the 
quantities imported takes place exclusively in the EU. Importers based in the EU can apply for a share of 
the frozen beef TRQ based on their historic imports of fresh and frozen beef as well as edible offal of 
bovine animals (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2004). No export licenses are needed to match 
the import license, therefore exporters have no information on the tariff that is going to be charged on their 
commodity. Hence, the rent is captured entirely by importers in the European Union. 
For the administration of the TRQ for frozen beef for processing, the same holds true as for the GATT 
frozen beef TRQ: There is no administration of the exporting side. Inside the EU, import rights are 
allocated to meat processing establishments which will then be issued an import license. There is no past 
performance criterion for this TRQ, meat processing companies can apply for as many import rights as 
they wish. If there are more applications then quota quantity, the European Commission will decide on a 
percentage cut for each application (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2005). As no export licenses 
are needed and therefore the importers are able to capture the rents accruing from this TRQ. 
11The model
The aim of this chapter is to provide information on the model that was set up specifically for the analysis 
of the EU´s and Mercosur´s proposals with regards to liberalization of beef trade. 
The problem to model
The relations to be modeled between production, processing and trade policies of beef of different qualities 
are complex. A schematic overview of these relations is given in Figure 7. 
As mentioned, the requirements for the high quality beef quota relate not only to special cuts, but also 
to certain methods of production. Thus, the decision of producing an animal that will supply high quality 
beef is already taken on farm level. However, as only special cuts qualify as high quality beef, with each 
animal of high quality slaughtered there will also be a certain percentage of beef meat of other quality. This 
special characteristic of beef production represents a Leontief technology.






























The resulting two types of fresh beef can be frozen and thus converted into frozen beef. 
Finally, there are four different channels through which beef from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay can 
enter the EU: The high quality beef TRQs, the two multilateral TRQs for frozen beef and the MFN regime. 
Of course, all types of beef can be consumed domestically or exported to other destinations than the EU 
too, but this is not depicted in Figure 7 for the ease of representation. 
Most of these relations are captured by the model. Only the two multilateral TRQs for frozen beef are 
merged into one, and the possibility of freezing high quality beef for importation under the high quality 
TRQ (indicated through dashed arrows) has been abstracted from. For Argentina this reflects the current 
legal situation, but exporters in Brazil and Uruguay could in fact choose to freeze high quality cuts and 
export them either under their TRQ for high quality beef or under the multilateral scheme for meat for 
processing. The main reason for not taking this possibility into account in the model is the minor role this 
seems to play, but ultimately the lack of information. 
12General features of the model 
The model set up for this study belongs to the class of partial equilibrium model. The model is formulated 
as a spatial price equilibrium models (SPE). Bilateral trade flows are modelled indirectly through a highly 
disaggregated commodity specification: Meat is not only characterized by its quality and processing stage, 
but also by its origin. For instance, beef produced in Argentina is seen as a different product as beef 
produced in Europe, and imports and exports of the seemingly same commodity are therefore possible. 
As the model aims at specifically analyzing trade between the EU and the Mercosur countries, four 
countries and a “Rest-of-the-World” aggregate are included: The European Union, Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay and the Rest-of-World aggregate. Paraguay, the associated members Bolivia and Chile are not 
included, neither is Venezuela which has become full member of the Mercosur in 2006. This is justified by 
their negligable role in beef trade. 
To allow for the most precise representation of TRQs and the arising quota rents, the model was 
formulated as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP), that links each model equation with a shadow 
variable, exploiting the so-called Kuhn-Tucker conditions (see NZIER (2001), CHIANG (2005)). 
To best reflect the relationships represented in Figure 7, two categories of cattle are distinguished in the 
model. From these animals, three different kinds of meat are produced. A compound type of meat was 
introduced in a reduced form to better reflect substitution effects in the consumers´ utility function. This 
leads to a total of six product categories: 1) High quality cattle, 2) other cattle, 3) fresh beef of high quality, 
4) other fresh beef, 5) frozen beef, 6) other meat products. Each of these product categories is additionally 
typified by the country of origin. This renders a total of 30 products in the model. 
For a thorough welfare analysis, the actors involved into the business have to be distinguishable in the 
model. Thus, four economic actors are represented in the model: 1) Farmers, 2) slaughterhouses, 3) 
freezers and 4) consumers.The distinction between slaughterhouses and freezers is somewhat artificial: In 
reality, chilling and freezing certainly takes place in the  slaughterhouse  itself. The reason behind the 
distinction here is that it eases explicit modelling of processing fresh to frozen beef depending on profit 
margins. 
For the actors in this model, profit or utility maximizing behaviour is assumed. There are behavioural 
functions for
- farmers´ supply of live animals
- the demand of slaughter houses for live cattle
- the demand of the deep freezing unit for fresh beef for freezing
- consumers´ demand for different meat types
The supply function of farmers as well as the demand function of slaughterhouses for live cattle is 
derived via Hotelling´s Lemma from a normalized quadratic profit function.
Consumers´ demand functions are derived from indirect utility functions via Roy´s identity. The 
demand system employed in this model has been taken and adapted from RYAN ET AL. (1999) and is known 
as the Generalized Leontief Quadratic Expenditure System. 
In addition to the behavioural functions, the model features, among others, 
- supply of meat derived from the demand for live animals (slaughter house) or fresh meat (freezing 
unit) with technical coefficients
- market clearing equations
- spatial arbitrage conditions
13- equations determining the quota rent
for each type of meat. 
A more detailed model description including the respective equations is available upon request from the 
first author of this paper. 
Model calibration 
Theoretical consistency, defined as the capability of the functional forms to reflect the assumed theoretical 
properties (LAU, 1986), is one desired property of the functions used in a model. Choosing an appropriate 
functional form is one step towards a theoretically consistent system of behavioural functions. If through 
this choice not all the conditions for consistency with the assumed economic behavior are satisfied, the 
chosen parameters must be determined in a way that the desired properties are guaranteed. This approach 
was taken here.
In the calibration process, the parameters of the behavioural functions are treated as variables. Their 
values are not completely free, but a priori information from other studies was used. Where available, 
econometrically estimated elasticities taken from other studies where used as a benchmark from which the 
deviation was minimized under a set of constraints.
The calibration process can thus be seen as an optimization process under constraints, providing 
1. elasticities that are as close as possible to the a priori information
2. parameters that render behavioural equations with the desired properties
For farmers´ supply and the demand of the processing industry, homogeneity of degree zero in prices in 
guaranteed through the functional form. Correct curvature is not automatically given, and must be ensured 
through the values of the matrix of substitution terms (or slope parameters).  Regarding the correct 
curvature, to produce a profit function that reflects the assumed behaviour, the matrix of substitution terms 
of supply has to be positive semidefinite. This is ensured by a Cholesky decomposition. Furthermore, the 
calibrated elasticities must add up to zero. This is achieved by forcing the sum of own and cross price 
elasticities for each product to zero. Finally, the set of parameters minimizing the square deviation of the 
calibrated elasticities from the original ones is found by an optimization process.
For human consumption, the functional form chosen ensures budget exhaustion and homogeneity of 
degree zero in prices and income. The slope parameters must therefore only ensure the correct curvature 
and fufil the symmetry conditions.
In the calibration process, it is ensured that the Hessian matrix is symmetric; moreover, the off-diagonal 
elements of the Hessian matrix are forced to be greater than zero and the diagonal elements to values 
smaller than zero. 
These restrictions imply two things: One is that negative own-price effects are assured. The other one is 
that positive cross-price effects in combination with negative own-price effects guarantee that the Hessian 
Matrix of the expenditure function is negative semidefinite and therefore correct curvature is achieved
5. In 
practical terms the condition posed on the off-diagonal elements states that all goods are Hicks substitutes, 
and no complementary relations between two goods are allowed for. 
5 For calibration of the parameters of the demand function, a Cholesky-decomposition is not necessary as long as only 
Hicksian substitutes are allowed for. Then, all the cross-price effects are forced to positive values. This ensures 
concavity of the expenditure function (and therefore a negative semidefinite Hessian matrix). 
14As in the case of the derivation of the parameters for supply and for demand of the processing industry, 
the parameters are forced to values that translate into elasticities as close as possible to given ones and at 
the same time are in line with the assumed micro-economic behaviour. 
Data sources and processing
The model is calibrated to a 3-year average over 2004-2006. Information on production of animals of 
different types, consumption of meat cuts and prices was, where available, taken from national sources like 
the Indicadores del Sector Vacuno of the Secretaria de Ganadería, Alimentos y Pesca in the case of 
Argentina,. Instituto Brasileiro the Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE) for Brazil and the Instituto Nacional de 
Carnes in the case of Uruguay. For the EU, data were obtained from Eurostat, and for the Rest-of-World 
aggregate from the FAO  and the OECD. 
It was rarely possible to obtain the full dataset needed from national or international statistics. In those 
cases, approximations had to be made based on available information, or technical coefficients obtained 
from the industry consultation were applied to derive the necessary information. 
Trade data was taken form Eurostat on 8-digit level for all trade flows involving the EU, and from the 
United Nations COMTRADE database else. The trade data had to be matched to the product aggregation 
for this model. This was done making three assumptions: 1) High quality beef is traded fresh or chilled, but 
never frozen, 2) Beef of other quality can be fresh or frozen 3) The composite commodity “other meat” 
consists of pork, sheep and goat meat as well as poultry.
When compiling data from different sources, the data set is very unlikely to be balanced initially. A 
procedure was set up to make the data consistent with the assumptions that markets are in equilibrium in 
the initial state. An optimization procedure under constraints was set up, that minimizes the percentage 
difference from the original data and at the same time renders a balanced data set. In this process, trade 
data was fixed, so adjustments were made only to consumption and production data. 
Generally, errors that are made in this step of data sampling and compilation are unlikely be decisive 
for the assessment of the trade liberalization scenarios. Production capacities were never considered as a 
limiting factor as regards the ability to benefit from trade liberalization. 
Scenarios
This assessment of who gets the benefits when the EU liberalises Mercosur´s access to the beef markets is 
based on the proposals presented by the two negotiation parties published in 2005. The analysis based on 
the  EU´s proposal  will hereinafter be referred to as the  EU-proposal, the proposal presented by the 
Mercosur countries as the Mercosur-proposal. 
For the beef sector, the EU-proposal includes, in the absence of a conclusion of the Doha round, the 
expansion of the existing TRQ by additional 100,000 tones of high quality beef. According to this 
proposal, the in-quota tariff shall be fixed at “50 percent of the lowest of the bound in-quota duty rates for 
the existing WTO bound tariff quotas for the relevant product” (USDA, 2005). In the case of the beef 
TRQs of the EU, this materializes into an in-quota tariff reduction of 50 percent. The over-quota tariff 
remains unchanged. The EU-proposal does not contain any provisions on how to allocate the additional 
quota quantities among the Mercosur countries, but the industry consultation that was carried out in the 
framework of this study revealed an intra industry agreement that lays down the distribution of the 
additional quota among the Mercosur countries. The agreed distribution of additional quota quantities as 
well as the resulting total quota quantities for high quality beef are presented in Table 2.
15Table 2 Trade liberalization proposals
 
Agreed distribution 
additional quota  
(tonnes)  total quota (tonnes) 
additional quota  
(tonnes)  total quota (tonnes) 
Argentina  29.5%  29,500  57,500  88,500  116,500 
Brazil  42.5%  42,500  47,500  127,500  132,500 
Uruguay  21.0%  21,000  27,300  63,000  69,300 
Paraguay  7.0%  7,000  8,000  21,000  22,000 
Sum  100%  100,000  140,300  300,000  340,300 
in-quota tariff reduction 
EU-Proposal  Mercosur-Proposal 
50%  100% 
Sources: Own calculations based on (USDA, 2005), personal communication with the Commission of the European Union and industry 
representatives.
The Mercosur proposal differs from the proposal made by the European Union mainly in two points: 
First, the additional quantities of high quality beef that were requested are three times higher than the EU 
offer. Instead of additional 100,000 tones as offered by the EU, the Mercosur countries requested 300,000 
tones of additional quota for high quality beef. Second, the Mercosur countries requested the abolition of 
the in-quota tariff instead of a reduction as proposed by the EU. Allocation of the quota among the 
Mercosur countries would also be achieved according to the abovementioned intra industry agreement, 
leading to the additional quota presented in Table 2.
Results
Impact on trade flows
The development of beef trade between the EU and the Mercosur countries under both scenarios is 
presented in Figure 1. 
The first observation is that under the EU proposal, the expansion of imports is very limited: Total beef 
imports of the EU increase by only 2 percent or slightly less than 8,000 tones. This stands in sharp contrast 
to the expansion of the high quality TRQs by more than ten times this quantity. This limited response of 
trade flows to the new conditions is explained by the quota-overfill in the base situation. As described in 
SKULLY (2001), expansion of an over filled quota does not lead to creation of new trade if the quota remains 
over filled in the new policy environment. 
























The second observation is that under the Mercosur proposal, the shipments of beef meat into the EU 
increase much stronger than under the provisions set out in the  EU-proposal. Under the  Mercosur-
proposal, the EU purchases more than 100,000 additional tones of beef meat from the South American free 
trade area, which is equivalent to an increase of almost 37 percent compared to the base situation. 
The third striking point is that under both scenarios, imports from other countries than Argentina, Brazil 
and Uruguay remain rather stable, indicating limited substitution effects.
While giving an overview, the aggregated representation in Figure 1 hides away some interesting detail. 
A more disaggregated view on the development of imports of the EU from the Mercosur countries is 
presented in Figure 9, where the developments of trade only of high quality beef are shown. 













































































































































Uruguay Argentina Brazil Rest-of-world
Trade (tonnes) Quota quantity (tonnes)
Source: Model results
17The model results indicate that Uruguay, that in the base situation exports the smallest quantities of beef 
to the EU, increases its exports to the latter country group by almost 65 percent under the conditions set out 
in the EU-proposal. Already under these relatively modest provisions, this small country does not fill the 
allocated quota anymore. The same finding holds true for the more far reaching Mercosur-proposal, but 
what is more, exports of high quality beef from Uruguay to the EU decrease slightly compared to the EU-
proposal, as meat originating in Uruguay is crowded out by meat originating in other Mercosur countries. 
For Argentina the picture is different. With considerable quantities exported at full levy in the base 
situation, the trade expansion under the EU-proposal follows the quota expansion, and the quota becomes 
the binding element in the trade regime. As the quota was over-filled in the base situation, this materializes 
into only slightly more than 4,000 additional tones of high quality beef from Argentina on the European 
market. The expansion of exports is far less than the additional quota of 29,500 tones allocated to this 
country. Under the Mercosur-proposal however, exports stay behind the largely increased quota. Imports 
of the EU of Argentinean high quality beef increase by over 48,000 tones or almost 90 percent compared to 
the base situation. 
Brazil has, in the current situation and despite its considerable exports, the smallest allocated quota 
among the three Mercosur countries considered here. Consequently, the EU-proposal does not provide this 
South American state with any further trade opportunities, the quota remains over-filled and the over-quota 
tariff the binding instrument. On the contrary, Brazil even reduces its exports to the EU slightly under this 
scenario, a development that can be explained by competing exports from the other two Mercosur 
countries. If on the other hand, an agreement was based on the bid of the South American country group, 
shipments of high quality beef from Brazil to the EU would increase considerably to over 132,000 tones, 
which implies a more then 85 percent increase compared to the base situation.
The above discussion shows that the  Mercosur-proposal  would de facto provide Uruguay and 
Argentina with a tariff and quota free access for high quality meat to the European market. Brazil on the 
other hand would be bound by the enlarged quota.
Welfare analysis
A natural question is the one for winners and losers of a possible understanding between the EU and the 
Mercosur countries. To answer this question, a welfare analysis for the different  countries and actors 
involved was carried out. 
An overview of the welfare changes is given in Table 3. It shows that both trade liberalisation scenarios 
would result in increased global welfare, though the absolute changes are small. Another salient feature of 
the welfare effect is that the EU would incur losses if an agreement was to be based on its own proposal, 
and for Uruguay, both liberalisation proposals would imply a negative welfare effect, though small in 
absolute terms. 
Overall, the relative changes may appear high when compared to other welfare analysis. This is because 
changes are relative to the welfare generated in the meat sector only, whereas in studies that cover a larger 
part of the economy, the base is normally larger and therefore the change relative to this enlarged base is 
smaller.
18Table 3 Welfare changes compared to the base situation
EU-proposal Mercosur proposal
Farmers percent 0.0 -0.5
absolute (Mio. EURO) -4.6 -53.1
Meat processing percent 0.0 -0.4
absolute (Mio. EURO) -3.3 -36.3
Quota rent percent 0.0 0.0
absolute (Mio. EURO) 0.0 0.0
Consumers percent 0.1 1.0
absolute (Mio. EURO) 96.8 989.0
Budget percent -47.0 -87.6
absolute (Mio. EURO) -280.6 -523.2
Total percent -0.2 0.3
absolute (Mio. EURO) -191.6 376.4
Farmers percent 2.5 2.6
absolute (Mio. EURO) 7.8 7.9
Meat processing percent 0.1 0.1
absolute (Mio. EURO) 1.5 1.4
Quota rent percent -100.0 -100.0
absolute (Mio. EURO) -16.5 -16.5
Consumers percent -3.1 -3.3
absolute (Mio. EURO) -16.9 -18.3
Budget percent 0.0 0.0
absolute (Mio. EURO) 0 0
Total percent -0.3 -0.4
absolute (Mio. EURO) -7.6 -9.0
Farmers percent 0.4 2.0
absolute (Mio. EURO) 12.9 69.6
Quota rent percent 137 -100
absolute (Mio. EURO) 7.2 -5.2
Meat processing percent 1.2 1.0
absolute (Mio. EURO) 112.3 89.0
Quota rent percent 137 -100
absolute (Mio. EURO) 95.4 -69.4
Consumers percent -0.1 -1.5
absolute (Mio. EURO) -9.6 -112.7
Budget percent 2.1 27.8
absolute (Mio. EURO) 4.1 53.5
Total percent 0.6 0.5
absolute (Mio. EURO) 119.7 99.4
Farmers percent -0.1 2.3
absolute (Mio. EURO) -1.4 54.4
Meat processing percent 1.5 1.4
absolute (Mio. EURO) 133.3 124.1
Quota rent percent 1,013 9
absolute (Mio. EURO) 136.8 1.2
Consumers percent 0.0 -0.6
absolute (Mio. EURO) 1.5 -99.7
Budget percent 0.0 0.0
absolute (Mio. EURO) 0 0
Total percent 0.5 0.3
absolute (Mio. EURO) 133.5 78.8
Total percent 0.0 0.1







The established model allows for analysis of welfare changes on more disaggregated level. For the EU, 
three sub-items of national welfare contribute to the losses under its own proposal: The farm sector and the 
meat processing industry experience welfare losses due to the increase competition from South America. 
The state revenue is reduced because less tariff revenue is generated. This is an outcome of both the 
19reduced in-quota tariff for imports of high quality beef and the regime switches for Argentina und Uruguay 
and the expanded TRQ for Brazil. The loss of tariff revenue accounts for the bulk of the total losses. The 
positive income effect for consumers in the EU is not sufficient to outweigh these losses. Under the 
scenario based on the Mercosur-proposal, the direction of change is not altered, but the changes are more 
pronounced. Particularly, the increases in consumer welfare over-compensate for losses in the other 
components, leading to an overall positive welfare effect for the EU. 
In Uruguay, the agricultural sector and the meat processing sector benefit from increased export 
opportunities and consequently higher prices for animals and meat of high quality, that outweigh the loss 
of the quota rent incurred by the slaughter houses. Consumer as adversely affected by higher consumer 
prices under both scenarios. 
A similar pattern is repeated in Argentina, with the difference that here through increased trade, the 
tariff revenue from the export tariff levied on meat increases, and that the quota rent is not lost under the 
EU-proposal. 
The brazilian case is somewhat more complex. Cattle farmers experience a small loss of welfare in the 
simulations based on the EU-proposal since exports decrease slightly due to increased competition from 
Argentina. The meat processing sector on the other hand increases its welfare compared to the base 
situation by 1.5 percent, because the increase of the quota rent compensates for the losses accruing from 
reduced export opportunities. Consumers benefit from lower prices, but to a very limited extent. Under the 
Mercosur-proposal, the picture is changed. Farmers benefit from higher prices triggered by increased 
exports. So does the meat processing industry, but at the same time, the quota rent increases only modestly, 
and consumers´ expenditure for meat increases. Taking these latter two effects together, trade liberalisation 
under the Mercosur-proposal is still welfare enhancing compared to the base situation, but slightly inferior 
to the impact under the EU proposal.
The role of the quota rents
Quota rents are a windfall profit generated from the specific trade policy instrument. As discussed earlier, 
their distribution can be decisive in the assessment of the welfare effects. In the case of the TRQs for high 
quality beef between the EU and the Mercosur countries, the quota rents remain fully in the exporting 
country, and there, with the exception of Argentina, entirely in the meat processing sector. 
The changes of the quota rents and their share in total welfare effects are depicted in Figure 10. In the 
upper panel, the contribution of the changes in the quota rent as a share of the total welfare effects is 
depicted for the EU-proposal, in the lower panel, for the Mercosur-proposal. 
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Source: Model results
Under the EU proposal, substantive shares of the total welfare effects can be attributed to changes in the 
quota rents arising from the high quality beef TRQs. Especially in the case of Brazil, where the quota is 
still over-filled under the EU-proposal, the quota rent is the determining factor for the sign of the overall 
welfare change. This is firmly grounded in the economic theory of TRQs, where expansion of an overfilled 
quota leads to the conversion of tariff revenue into quota rent. If this rent was captured by the importing 
country, i.e. the EU, liberalization according to the EU-proposal would result in welfare losses for Brazil. 
In Argentina, despite accounting for roughly 85 percent of the total gains in welfare, the quota rent is 
not critical for the overall welfare effect. Even if the rent was captured by the importing side, the policy 
change would be advantageous for Argentina. Another interesting detail here is that despite the fact that the 
quota is binding now, the change in the quota rent is still positive, a result of both the in-quota tariff 
reduction and the intersection of the supply and demand curves. 
Uruguay is a particular case: As the quota rent vanishes away under the provisions of the EU-proposal, 
Uruguay would have greater interest in this agreement if the quota rent was initially captured by the 
21importing country, and consequently the importer would be the party incurring the loss. The distribution of 
the rent is decisive for the direction of the total income change for Uruguay: While in the current setting, 
the welfare impact on national level is negative, it would be positive if the quota rent was initially captured 
(and consequently lost) by the importing party.
From the perspective of the EU, liberalization according to the  EU-proposal  would be welfare 
enhancing if the quota rents were captured by European importers. 
The role of the quota rents is less marked in the scenario based on the Mercosur-proposal. For Brazil, 
the role of the quota rent is limited, thus an alternative distribution on international level would not change 
the picture for Brazil much. Argentina looses the entire quota rent, but the quota rent is not key to the 
overall national welfare effect either. Only for Uruguay, the quota rent determines the sign of the overall 
economic impact.
Conclusions
The main question in this paper was who gets the benefits when the EU liberalises Mercosur’s access to 
the European beef markets. To answer this question, two different approaches were taken. 
One was the construction of a partial equilibrium model that operates at a sufficiently low level of 
product to capture most of the complex EU-Mercosur trade relations. The model allows for welfare 
analysis of different stake holders involved in the business, and determines the quota rents as an 
endogenous variable.
To ascertain the distribution of these quota rents, the second approach taken was a consultation of 
stakeholders from the beef exporting and importing sectors.
Two policy scenarios were analysed. The main findings of the study are the following:
- The rents arising from the high quality beef TRQs allocated to individual Mercosur countries is 
fully captured by the exporting countries. The rents from the multilateral frozen are fully captured 
by EU importers.
- Within the Mercosur countries, the stakeholder assigned the right to export under the high quality 
TRQ obtains the rent. In Brazil and Uruguay, these are mainly companies in the meat processing 
and trading business. In Argentina, farmers obtain the rents arising from 7% of the exports under 
the preferential tariff.
- An agreement based on the EU-proposal would have only limited impact on trade flows. However, 
welfare is affected as a redistribution of tariff revenue to quota rents takes place. This implies a 
redistribution of income from the EU to the exporting countries, and leaves the EU with a negative 
welfare impact.
- An agreement based on the Mercosur-proposal would lead to de-facto free trade between the EU 
and, with the exception of Brazil, the Mercosur countries: The largely expanded quotas are no 
longer binding, and the in-quota tariff is zero. 
- Under the Mercosur-proposal, all Mercosur countries covered in the analysis loose the quota rent 
that they captured in the initial policy setting. Nevertheless, improved trade opportunities outweigh 
these losses, so that the welfare change is positive even for the stakeholder that obtained the rent in 
the initial setting.
From a methodologic point of view, modelling bilateral trade through a very detailed commodity 
breakdown is technically feasible and renders plausible results. The number of variables and 
22parameters however is large, making calibration of the model to well-behaved parameters a rather 
challenging task for a model with a limited country and commodity space. 
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